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DREAM TEAM OR EVIDENTIARY NIGHTMARE?
DEFINING WHEN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS PART
OF THE PROSECUTION TEAM
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2002, a serial sniper terrorized the greater Washington,

D.C. area.' The sniper murdered ten people and wounded three more in
Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.2 Investigators from local and
state police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Pentagon participated in the
extensive manhunt that led to the apprehension of the suspected murderers
at a rest stop in Maryland. 3 The investigation of suspects John Muhammad
and Lee Malvo revealed links to shootings and miscellaneous crimes in
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Washington, and Antigua. 4 By the
time the Commonwealth of Virginia tried and convicted both Muhammad
and Malvo for capital murder, the list of states, countries, and agencies
involved in some aspect of the investigation included approximately eleven
states, two foreign countries, and five federal agencies. The prosecution
faced an enormous problem determining how many of these participants

See generally Anne Kornblut and Wayne Washington, End of the Manhunt,
Oct. 25, 2002, at AI, available at 2002 WL 101980053 (describing shootings in suburban Washington, D.C. and capture of suspected snipers John Muhammad and
Lee Malvo).
2 See Eunice Moscoso, Sniper Hunt Spreads to Tacoma and Alabama, THE ATLANTA
J. & ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 24, 2002, at Al (detailing search for information on sniper
suspect Muhammad leads to Fort Lewis, WA area and Marion, AL).
3 See id.; see also Kornblut and Washington, supra note I (mentioning unprecedented use of manpower from federal and state agencies in sniper hunt).
4 See supra notes 1-3; see also Andrew Jacobs, Witness Recalls Days Spent With the
Sniper Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A26 (stating snipers also considered
suspects in shootings in four other states); Dean E. Murphy, Officials Also Suspect Pair in
Earlier West Coast Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A28 (detailing snipers' connection
to Tacoma, Washington shootings).
5 See supra note 4. The participants in the investigation were Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Washington, D.C.,
Antigua, Jamaica, the FBI, the ATF, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the
United States Army, and the Pentagon. Id. See also Stephen Braun, Mark Fineman, and
Ralph Vartabedian, In a Sniper's Grip, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at Al, available at 2002
WL 2512878 (mentioning several agencies involved in hunt for snipers).
BOSTON GLOBE,
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were actually part of the prosecution team. 6 If an agency is a team mem-

ber, the prosecution must request and review any material exculpatory evidence contained in the team member's files.7 The prosecution must then
produce this evidence to the defense. 8
In the sniper case, the prosecution faced the daunting task of reviewing and producing evidence provided by the numerous agencies that
assisted with the investigation. The cause of this vast production process is
the expansion of the responsibilities of federal and state prosecutors by the
Supreme Court of the United States in its landmark decision Brady v.
Maryland nearly 40 years ago. The Warren Court held in Brady that, under the Due Process Clause, the prosecution must disclose all material exculpatory evidence in its possession upon the request of the defense.' 0 The
expansion of this ruling over the years has created a confusing mix of deci-

sions from the circuit courts regarding the production of documents not in
the files of the prosecution, but in the possession of other agencies. "'
6

The prosecution faced a situation similar to that of the sniper prosecution in the

cases against Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh for the bombing of the Murrah Building
in Oklahoma City in 1995. See generally United States v. Nichols, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D.
Colo. 1999); United States v. McVeigh, 945 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Colo. 1997). In McVeigh,
the court ordered the prosecution to request and review information from the CIA, Defense
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency for exculpatory material in response
to motions from the defense. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1443-44. The court described
the prosecution's burden under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as informing
"themselves about everything that is known in all of the archives and all of the data banks
of all of the agencies collecting information which could assist in the construction of alternative scenarios to that which they intend to prove at trial." Id. at 1450. In Nichols, the
defense moved for a new trial because the prosecution did not examine 50,000 information
control sheets created by the FBI as it investigated the Oklahoma City bombing. Nichols,
67 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. These sheets contained information pertaining to the investigation
and conversations between agents. id. Although the court ordered that 12,000 pages be
turned over to the defense, it also stated that "a complete review of every piece of paper
generated by the many offices and agents concerned with this matter is an impossible task."
Id. at 1202. The court found that the defense's requests exceeded realistic limits on searching for evidence. Id.
7 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (discussing responsibility of
prosecution to discover and disclose material evidence).
8 See id.
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
1oId. at 87 (declaring prosecution's suppression of confession violated Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1, stating in
pertinent part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... The Fifth Amendment applies the same restrictive language to the
federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11 See infra notes 70-96 and accompanying text (discussing varied decisions from
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits);
United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1175 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting circuits split on
applying broad interpretation of Brady to other agencies related to prosecution). The Tenth
Circuit applied its analysis from Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801
(10th Cir. 1995), a case of first impression for the court, on the issue of imputing knowl-
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The Tenth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Combs' 2 illustrates
the division existing among the circuit courts on the production of evidence in the possession of other agencies. The court examined the different positions of the circuits as revealed by their decisions.' 3 The Tenth
Circuit noted that the First and Third Circuits construed Brady broadly, the
Fifth Circuit applied a more moderate approach, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Brady narrowly, and the4 District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits
employed an unclear approach.'
edge possessed by different arms of the government to the prosecution. See Combs, 267
F.3d at 1174.
2 267 F.3d at 1174-75 (discussing, but not weighing in on, split between circuits on
constitutional duty to disclose material evidence). The court found it necessary to discuss
the circuit split because both parties cited cases from different circuits to support their positions. Id. at 1173-74. The court relied on its holding in Smith in which it imputed knowledge of a separate murder investigation conducted by Torrance County authorities to the
Bernalillo County prosecution, because the prosecution had actual knowledge of the separate investigations. Id. at 1174. The prosecution's actual knowledge allowed the court to
avoid addressing the full extent of imputing knowledge to the prosecution when possessed
by an agency or arm of the state. Id. In Combs, the defendant appealed his conviction on
conspiracy to distribute and possession of marijuana charges on the grounds that Pretrial
Services was "an agency of the United States government" and its knowledge was imputable to the prosecution. Id. at 1170-72. The prosecution's key witness claimed to be an
innocent dupe of the defendant; however, after the trial, the prosecution learned from Pretrial Services that the witness failed seven drug tests by testing positive for marijuana. Id. at
1171-72. The prosecution immediately notified the defendant of the test results, which led
to this appeal. Id. at 1172. The court found that the evidence was immaterial so it did not
need to resolve the issue of whether or not Pretrial Services was an agency related to the
prosecution. Combs, 267 F.3d at 1175. The court did state, however, that the prosecution
could have easily checked with Pretrial Services before the trial. Id.
13 See id. at 1174-75 (discussing viewpoints of First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and
D.C. Circuits regarding imputability of knowledge possessed by other agencies to prosecution).
14 See id. (analyzing decisions reached by other courts). Cases cited
by the Tenth
Circuit as interpreting Brady broadly are United States v. Thornton, I F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating prosecution must inquire of all enforcement agencies potentially connected to
witnesses); United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding prosecution
"duty bound to demand compliance with disclosure responsibilities by all relevant dimensions of the government"); and United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding evidence in actual or constructive possession producible by prosecution). See
Smith, 50 F.3d at 825 n.36. An example of the Fifth Circuit's moderate approach is Williams v. Whitlev, 940 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding prosecution had access to easily
available information and thus possessed knowledge of it). See Smith, 50 F.3d at 825 n.36.
The Tenth Circuit illustrated the undefined approach of the D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit
by citing United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating prosecution's disclosure duties extend to information possessed by agencies "closely aligned with
the prosecution") and United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding obligation on prosecution to produce materials even if possessed by another agency).
See Smith, 50 F.3d at 825 n.36. The narrow approach, which suggests that Brady does not
apply to all agencies, is demonstrated by United States v. Sherfin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1218 (6th
Cir. 1995) (holding Brady did not apply to Pretrial Services report as not evidence pos-
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This note focuses on the difficulties faced by the courts in defining
when a government agency or representative is a member of the prosecution team. Part II covers the history of Brady and its expansion. Part III
discusses the different approaches developed by the circuits to define who
is a member of the prosecution team and how far the prosecution must go
in searching for Brady documents in the possession of team members. Part
IV addresses the problems with these approaches and the need for the Supreme Court to establish guidelines for determining membership on the
prosecution team.
II. BRADY AND ITS PROGENY
The Brady rule imposes a constitutional duty on the prosecution to
disclose exculpatory evidence.' 5 In addition, state and federal rules of
criminal procedure, as well as statutes, impose similar requirements for
prosecutorial disclosure of information in response to a defendant's request. 16 These other disclosure statutes and rules, however, do not work
together with Brady in determining who is a member of the prosecution
team.
A.

Brady v. Maryland

The foundation of the Brady rule is that withholding material exculpatory evidence is a violation of a defendant's due process right to a fair
trial.' 8 In 1963, the Court examined whether the prosecution deprived John
sessed by prosecution). See Smith, 50 F.3d at 825 n.36.
15 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that due process violated by prosecution's
withholding of favorable evidence).
16 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (noticing alibis), FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (producing wit-

ness statements), and

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

3.8(d) (timely disclosure to de-

fense) as examples of other rules that also play a part in the disclosure of evidence during
the criminal discovery process. See also Joy Jakunas & Michael J. Cedrone, Thirty-First
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure,I1. Preliminary Proceedings, Discovery, 90 GEO.

L.J. 1415, 1430 (2002) (explaining other rules require disclosure); Stephen P. Jones, Note,
The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L.

REV. 735, 747 (1995) (analyzing other disclosure responsibilities); Lisa M. Kurcias, Note,
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpator' Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1216
(2000) (discussing Model Rule 3.8(d)); John C. Thomure, Jr., Kyles v. Whitley: An Opportunity Lost?: An Examination of the Rule of Discovery Concerning the Disclosure of Impeachment Material Contained in Personnel Files of Testifying Government Agents in
Federal Criminal Cases, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 553 (2000) (describing statutory provi-

sions requiring disclosure in federal criminal cases).

17 See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the
Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 331, 348-62 (1998) (analyzing complemen-

tary but separate requirements of Brady, Jencks Act, and Rule 16).

18 See Smith v. Sec'y of New Mexico Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 823 (10th Cir.

1995) (explaining Brady claim based on due process argument).
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Brady of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by suppressing
the actual murderer's confession.' 9 The Court based its holding on its earlier decision in Mooney v. Holohan.20 In Mooney, the prosecution intentionally introduced perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. 2' The
Mooney Court focused primarily on the intentional misbehavior of the
22
prosecutor.
In contrast, the Brady Court focused on the injury suffered
by the defendant because the prosecution withheld evidence.23 The shift in
emphasis between the two decisions shows a growing interest by the Court
to avoid convictions at any price, especially those that result in unfair
treatment to an accused 2 4
The Due Process Clause provides the framework for the Court's
holding in Brady.25 The Due Process Clause guarantees one of the most
important and basic rights possessed by an individual - the right to a fair
trial.26 Due process is comprised of two separate functions: substantive
19 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84-86. Petitioner learned of the suppressed statement after
his own trial, conviction and sentencing, and affirmance of his conviction. Id. at 84.
20 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (ruling nondisclosure of perjured testimony incompatible

with basic requirements of justice). In Mooney, the Court stated that the due process requirement was unsatisfied when the state intentionally deceived the court and jury by knowingly using perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. Id. See also Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (holding suppressed evidence and use of perjured testimony sufficient
for due process violation).
21 See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110 (discussing petitioner's claim based on deliberate
actions of prosecution). Convicted of murder, the defendant in Mooney claimed that the
prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony to convict him and withheld impeachment
evidence. Id. The Court stated that "such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction
and imprisonment of a defendant is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice...." Id.at 112.
22 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976) (discussing
difference in
emphasis between Mooney and Brady decisions).
23 See id. at 104 (analyzing Brady's holding as concerned that trial's result unfairly
influenced by withheld evidence).
24 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (declaring disclosure important
in
preserving criminal trial as selected forum for learning truth); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (holding prosecution's nonproduction of evidence violates constitutional due process if defendant deprived of fair trial); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (stating conviction obtained by deliberate use of false evidence basically unfair); Brady, 373 U.S. at 8788 (discussing justice tarnished when criminal trials unfair).
25 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (mandating due process violated if suppression
of
evidence results in depriving defendant of fair trial); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (applying due
process to withholding of evidence as interfering with defendant's right to equitable trial);
Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (agreeing with Appeals Court that suppression of confession violated
due process); Smith, 50 F.3d at 823 (explaining Brady holding based on due process argument).
26 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, section 1; Cynthia L. Corcoran, Note, Prosecutors
Must Disclose Exculpatory Information When the Net Effect of the Suppressed Evidence
Makes it Reasonably Probablethat Disclosure Would Have Produceda Different Result, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 832, 832 (1996) (explaining operation of Due Process Clause in criminal justice system).
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and procedural due process.27 Procedural due process requires that the
government adheres to set procedures when taking away an individual's
liberty. - The Brady rule encompasses procedural due process when actions by the prosecution interfere with a defendant's fair trial. 29 The Brady
Court thus obligated the prosecution to make a reasonable attempt to discover the truth for the defendant's benefit and to ensure a fair trial.30
By emphasizing fairness of trials and standards of justice, Brady altered the view of criminal trials as a contest between the prosecutor and the
defense.3' Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas stated that fair criminal
trials are as important to society as convicting the guilty. 32 The courts interpret Brady by breaking down its holding into three elements necessary
for a successful claim. 33 First, courts examine whether the prosecution
suppressed evidence. 34 Second, courts analyze whether the evidence favored the defendant. 35 Third, courts decide whether the evidence provided
material support for either guilt or punishment.36 The prosecution's failure
21

See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the FourteenthAmendment: The

Unfidfilled Promise, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1149 (1992) (describing components of
substantive and procedural due process and their differences).
2" See id. (discussing uses of Due Process Clause and focus of procedural due process).

29 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 (stating that prosecution's failure to produce exculpa-

tory evidence or penalty reducing evidence it creates a "proceeding that does not comport
with the standards ofjustice").
31 See Robert Hochman, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Searchfor Truth in
Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1692 (1996) (analyzing Court's basing duty to
search in Due Process Clause's requirement for government's compliance with adequate
procedures to protect individual's rights).
31 See id. at 1673-74 (explaining Brady shifted focus of trials from conviction to
administration of justice); Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Searchfor Truth or a Game of Strategy? The Circuit Split Over the Prosecutor's Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpator, Inf)rmation to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 143-44 (2001) (noting Brady's
emphasis on fairness and justice); Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, 18-SPG CRIM. JUST.
4, 7 (2003) (identifying Supreme Court's reliance on truth as necessary to fair trial).
32 See Bradyv, 373 U.S. at 87. Justice Douglas wrote, "Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Id.
33 See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972) (analyzing central issues of
Brady holding as made up of three parts); United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1993) (describing three Brady requirements); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Moore's identification of heart of Brady holding as containing
three factors); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991) (identifying
three components included in Brady complaint); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481
(5th Cir.1980) (describing factors necessary for valid complaint under Brady); Hochman,
supra note 30, at 1674 (explaining development of Brady analysis).
34 See Hochman, supra note 30, at 1674 (asserting suppression terminology evolved
from Moonev).
35 See Hochman, supra note 30 at 1674 (describing nature of evidence as supporting
defendant's claim of innocence if evidence tends to exculpate or reduce penalty).
36 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (stating due process violated by withholding evidence
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to provide the defendant withS such
• 37 evidence could result in reversible error
after the defendant's conviction: The Brady decision presented the lower
courts with a number of questions to answer relating to possession of evidence, requests for evidence, the meaning of "material," and whether the
favorable or exculpatory evidence must prove the innocence of the defendant. 38 The Court addressed these questions itself in three cases that
broadened the scope of Brady.39
B.

Expansion of Brady

The Court initially considered the prosecutor's duty to voluntarily
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and defined the standard of
materiality in United States v. Agurs.40 In Agurs, the Court discussed three
distinct scenarios to determine the materiality of evidence and whether
disclosure of that evidence was required. 4' The first scenario involved the
use of perjured testimony by the prosecution and required setting aside the
conviction if the testimony likely affected the jury's decision-making process. 42 The second scenario involved how the prosecution's failure to rerelevant to defendant's guilt or punishment). The Brady Court stated "[w]e now hold that
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
37 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 340 (analyzing Brady as imposing duty on prosecution to produce favorable evidence or risk overturned verdict).
38 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(b), at 475 (2d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2003) (discussing uncertainty created among federal circuits by Brady decision).
39 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (holding prosecutor bears duty to discover favorable
evidence known to those working for government's benefit including police); Baglev, 473
U.S. at 682 (deciding withheld evidence material if different trial result reasonably likely
with evidence's disclosure); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (holding material exculpatory evidence
gives prosecution notice of duty to provide even when defense makes no request); see also
5 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 24.3(b), at 475-76 (referring to most influential Brady progeny
cases decided by Supreme Court).
40 427 U.S. at 107 (holding prosecutor's duty to produce material exculpatory evidence not limited to specific requests). The defendant claimed self-defense in her conviction for the second-degree murder of Sewall with his own knife following intimate relations
at a motel. Id. at 98-99. Defense counsel later learned that Sewall possessed a criminal
record for assault and carrying dangerous weapons (knives), which supported defendant's
claim of self-defense. Id. at 100. The prosecution argued, in part, that the lack of a specific
request for the evidence and the lack of materiality of the evidence left it with no duty to
produce the criminal record. Id. at 101.
41 See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
&
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 3D § 254.2 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (describing Justice Stevens' explanation of three-part standard of materiality in Agurs).
42 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (applying strict standard of materiality to perjured testimony cases); see also Corcoran, supra note 26, at 847-48 (discussing Court's establishment of three standards of materiality); Felice F. Guerrieri, Comment, Law & Order: Rede-
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spond to a specific request for evidence required setting aside a conviction
if production of the suppressed evidence might have changed the trial's
outcome.4 3 The third scenario, as exemplified by Agurs, involved the duty
44
to respond to a general request or nonrequest for exculpatory evidence.
In this instance, the obligation to disclose originates from the nature of the
evidence itself.45 If the evidence clearly supports an assertion of innocence, the prosecution must produce it even without a specific request.46
The difference in the three situations presented by Agurs is that the
standard of materiality used for the nonrequest or general request is higher
than the standard used in the specific request cases.47 This higher standard
requires a finding of guilt based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.48 If
the omitted evidence gives rise to a reasonable doubt that previously did
not exist, a constitutional error exists. 49 The judge must then review the
total evidentiary record to determine the importance of the omitted evidence. 50 The existence of reasonable doubt in the judge's mind as to a
finding of guilt justifies a new trial, especially if the validity of a verdict is
already uncertain. 5'
Nine years later, the Court collapsed the Agurs three-part materiality test into one test for failure to disclose favorable evidence by the prosefining the Relationship Between Prosecutorsand Police, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 353, 358 (2001)
(explaining Court's decision in Agurs).
4 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104 (analyzing Brady as example of
second disclosure
situation because of specific evidence request before trial). The Court emphasized, "[wihen
the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is
seldom, if ever, excusable." Id. at 106.
44 See id. at 107 (finding no difference between general request and no request).
45 See id. (explaining exculpatory nature of evidence signals prosecution of duty to
produce).
46 See id. (discussing equal need for production of exculpatory evidence whether
general request or no request made).
47 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (explaining materiality standard different between
specific request, no request and general request situations). The materiality standard applies
to the level of review required of the evidence not disclosed to the defendant. Id. at 106-08.
The Court explained that where the defendant makes no specific request for evidence, the
standard is stricter than the harmless-error standard (an error that does not effect the case's
outcome) but more lenient to the defense than the burden imposed by the newly discovered
evidence standard (evidence would probably produce a different verdict at a new trial). Id.
at 11 1-12. Where there is a specific request, the Court suggested that a standard more lenient towards the defense might apply as the prosecution's "failure to make any response is
seldom, if ever, excusable." Id. at 106.
48 See id. at 112 (describing need for evidence clearly supporting guilty finding).
49 See id. (finding nondisclosure of material evidence creates constitutional error by
violating due process).
50 See id. at 112 (evaluating omitted evidence to weigh its effect on trial's outcome
when combined with other evidence).
51 See id. at 113 (granting new trial if omission leads to reasonable doubt); see also
Guerrieri, supra note 42, at 358-59 (explaining reasonable doubt should guide disclosure
and ordering of new trials).
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cution, regardless of the existence of a request by the defense.52 The Court
held that whether there is no request, a general request, or a specific request, "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. 53 The Court defined reasonable probability as
"a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome., 5 4 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, also disclaimed any difference between impeachment and exculpatory evidence for Brady purposes, contrary to the lower court's findings below. 55 Interpreting Brady, the Bagley
Court extended the prosecution's obligation to disclose materials possessed
by an investigative branch of the prosecution, even if the prosecution
lacked knowledge of the documents. 56 Holding the prosecution responsible for documents it does not possess is based on the Court's doctrine of
imputed knowledge, or constructive possession, first seen in Giglio v.
United States.5 7 In Giglio, the Supreme Court attributed one United States

Attorney's promise of immunity given to a grand jury witness to another
United States Attorney who used the same witness during the trial of the
case, even though the second United States Attorney had no knowledge of
the promise.58
52

See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (holding evidence material only if reasonable probabil-

ity of different outcome if produced). In Bagley, the defendant filed a pretrial discovery
request seeking any evidence regarding compensation given to the government's witnesses
for their testimony. Id. at 669-70. After his conviction on narcotics charges, defendant
learned that the government failed to disclose contracts paying two key witnesses for their
testimony. Id. at 671-72. See also Corcoran, supra note 26, at 851 (examining formulation
of new materiality standard); Guerrieri, supra note 42, at 359 (describing reworking of test
for materiality of exculpatory evidence by Court).
53 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
54 Id. Justice Marshall disagreed with the reasonable probability standard pronounced
by the Court, instead favoring full disclosure of evidence that possesses favorable overtones
for the defense. Id. at 699-700 (Marshall, J. dissenting). See also Michael E. Gardner,
Note, An Affair to Remember: FurtherRefinement of the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 68 Mo. L. REv. 469, 478-79 (2003) (discussing problems with reasonable probability standard).
55 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-77 (following Court's precedents, rejecting any distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence); see also Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding nondisclosure of evidence pertaining to witness' credibility falls under Brady rule).
56 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 672 n.4 (acknowledging Assistant U.S. Attorney
lacked
knowledge of contracts made by other government agencies with witnesses); Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor'sDuty to Search the Intelligence Community for
Brady Material,88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1489-90 (2003) (discussing application of constructive possession/imputed knowledge doctrine).
"7 405 U.S. at 154 (1972) (holding since prosecution speaks for government, act of
one of its agents also attributable to government); Villaverde, supra note 56, at 1489 (discussing first application of doctrine in Giglio).
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151-52 (describing government's failure to disclose promise of
leniency to key witness in return for testimony).
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The Supreme Court expressly extended the Giglio concept of constructive possession to all government agencies in Kyles v. Whitley,5 9 holding that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police." 6° Evidentiary nondisclosure results in a due process
violation only if the favorable evidence satisfies the materiality standard
established in Bagley, regardless of whether the prosecution or other government actors possess it. 6 1 The Court stressed that under the Bagley materiality standard, the government bears the burden of disclosing favorable
evidence when the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence leads to a
"reasonable probability" of the disclosure producing a different result.62
In conclusion, Brady and its progeny established that for a Brady
violation to exist, the prosecution must suppress, either willfully or inadvertently, exculpatory or impeachment evidence.6 3 Brady and the cases it
generated also established that the prosecution must disclose material evi64
dence whether or not the defense specifically requests it.
Evidence is
now considered material if withholding it creates a reasonable probability
of doubt in the result of the proceeding.65 Additionally, the prosecution
bears the burden of discovering any favorable evidence and disclosing it to
the defense, even evidence known to others working for the government
but unknown to the prosecution. 66
None of these cases, however, specifically addresses the extent of
the prosecution's obligation to search for evidence in the possession of
other government agencies based on their membership on the prosecution
5' 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

Id. at 437.
See id. at 437-38 (emphasizing materiality standard affects consideration of due
process violation); Todd E. Jaworsky, Note & Comment, A Defendant's Right to Exculpatory Evidence: Does the ConstitutionalDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Extend to
60
61

New Evidence Discovered Post-Conviction?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 245, 250 (2002) (describing effect of Court's decision in Kyles as broadening constructive possession ,octrine).
In Kyles, the jury convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him to death without
hearing inconsistent statements by an informant, statements by eyewitnesses, and other
evidence favorable to the defendant. 514 U.S. at 428-29. Kyles' first trial resulted in a
hung jury and a mistrial. Id. at 421-22. The second trial resulted in his conviction for firstdegree murder and a death sentence. Id. at 431.
62 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (comparing government's "degree of discretion" with burden of evaluating and producing evidence).
63See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (broadening framework for production of evidence by
prosecution).
64See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (requiring prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence
to avoid harm to defendant).
65 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (holding that if suppressed evidence lacks materiality,
than its suppression does not necessitate new trial).
66 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (deciding failure of other government agents to provide
information to prosecution no excuse for nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence).
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team. 67 The current disparity of approaches found among the federal circuit courts provides a strong incentive for the Supreme Court to reassess
this issue. 68 The Court's overriding concern should be the consistent application of the law to ensure a fair and just trial for all criminal defendants. 69
III. DEFINING MEMBERSHIP ON THE PROSECUTION'S TEAM
In general, the circuit courts agree that considering a governmental
agency a member of the prosecution team requires some level of participation in the investigation or prosecution in question. 70 The challenge for the
courts lies in recognizing cases in which an agency engages in activities
distinct from the investigation, such as merely providing information, as
opposed to actively participating in the investigation at issue. 7 1 Three ap-

67 See Hochman, supra note 30, at 1679 (discussing Supreme Court's failure to clarify scope of prosecutor's obligation to search for evidence).
6 See Thomure, Jr., supra note 16, at 553 (discussing application of Ninth Circuit's
broader standard of disclosure in Seventh Circuit). The Ninth Circuit's standard requires
the government to review the personnel files of officers or agents for impeachment or exculpatory evidence upon the defendant's discovery request. See id. at 562. The Seventh
Circuit, however, places the burden on the defendant to show that impeachment evidence
exists in the personnel file of the officer before mandating a review by the government. See
id. at 567. The disparity exemplified by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits results in inequitable treatment of defendants from circuit to circuit. See id. at 571. In the Seventh Circuit, a
defendant may never learn of impeachment or exculpatory evidence contained in an officer's file because of the inability of the defendant to show such evidence existed. See id. In
the Ninth Circuit, however, a defendant could receive a reduced sentence because the
prosecutor chose not to use an agent based on the impeachment evidence discovered in his
file. See Thomure, Jr., supra note 16, at 571.
69 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 (stating government's dominant concern to achieve
justice). The Court stated that, "though the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the
accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client's overriding
interest that 'justice shall be done."' id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
70 See United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to
impute knowledge of various agencies to prosecution when not part of investigation); Odle
v. Calderon, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (outlining case law limiting disclosure to agencies involved in investigation); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 489, at 70 (1989
& Supp. 2002) (extending disclosure to agencies participating in investigation and reporting
to prosecution); Fredman, supra note 17, at 347 (noting agency member of prosecution
team when it participates in investigation or prosecution); Robert S. Mahler, Extracting the
Gate Key: Litigating Brady Issues, 25-MAY CHAMPION 14, 17-18 (2003) (noting prosecution must establish that review of all files possessed by participating agencies has occurred);
Thomure, Jr. supra note 16, at 571 (analyzing Seventh Circuit's rule requiring participation
in investigation or prosecution).
71 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 348 (outlining difficulties in deciding alignment
issues).

92

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

proaches have developed over the years to address the challenge: narrow,
broad, and moderate. 72
A.

The Narrow Approach

Circuits applying the narrow approach adhere to a less expansive interpretation of the Brady rule. 73 Circuits that use this approach ascribe
knowledge possessed by employees of a different government office to a
prosecutor on a limited basis.74 The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
follow this approach and refuse to impute the knowledge of a federal or
state government entity to the federal prosecutors on the case without some
connection between the two. 75 The Second Circuit fears that the limitless
extension of the boundaries of the government's knowledge will result in
the adoption of a "monolithic view of government," which would immobilize the criminal justice system.76 The Second Circuit emphasizes that the
critical factor in any analysis is the extent of involvement between the
prosecutor's office and other agencies, and the possible existence of a joint
investigation.77 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits concur with the Second
72

See Combs, 267 F.3d at 1174-75 (describing approaches of First and Third Circuits

as broad, Fifth Circuit as moderate, and Sixth Circuit as narrow).
73 See Chandras v. McGinnis, No. 01 Civ. 2519, 2002 WL 31946711, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 13, 2002) (stating court never mandated prosecution to discover evidence in possession of other agencies uninvolved in investigation); United States v. Failla, No. CR-9300294, 1993 WL 547419, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1993) (explaining only when agencies
cooperate closely is knowledge of exculpatory evidence justly imputable). In Failla, the
court determined that simply because various law enforcement agencies worked together on
the prosecution of one case did not automatically mean that they cooperated on a related
aspect of a different case.
74 See Shakur v. U.S., 32 F. Supp. 2d 651, 658 (cautioning against imposing unlimited duty to disclose on prosecutor) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255
(2d Cir. 1998)).
75 See United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing to hold
Missouri prosecutor accountable for information possessed by Illinois prosecutor); United
States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to attribute knowledge of Omaha
police to federal prosecutor); United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971)
(rejecting attempt to assign knowledge of Florida prosecutor's information to Assistant U.S.
Attorney); Berger v. Stinson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 359, 366-67 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to
ascribe awareness of Florida criminal proceedings against witness to prosecutor); Shakur,
32 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (refusing to impute knowledge of NYPD undercover agent to federal
prosecutors).
76 See Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (noting need to limit prosecution's duty to seek
evidence from other agencies not involved in prosecution of case) (quoting United States v.
Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
77 See United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (examining
analysis used by court in determining relationship between agencies and prosecution). The
court held that because no joint investigation occurred between the U.S. Attorney's Office
and other federal agencies, the prosecutor need not produce materials from those agencies.
Id. See also Bell v. Poole, No. 00 CV 5214, 2003 WL 21244625, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
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Circuit and find untenable the presumption that the prosecution has constructive knowledge of all information known to any other federal or state
government agency. 78
B.

The Broad Approach

In contrast to the narrow approach, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits impute an extensive array of knowledge to the prosecution.7 9 The
First Circuit views the government as a single entity and requires the
prosecutor to search the files of the United States Attorney, the Justice
Department and its subsidiary agencies, the DEA, the FBI, and all other
government agencies.80 The court refuses to view the government as a
"congery of independent hermetically sealed compartments" with each
agency as a "separate sovereignty., 8 ' The rationale for such a broad policy
is to prevent injustice. 82 The Third Circuit follows suit in applying 8a3 theory of constructive knowledge between federal and state agencies.
If,
2003) (holding no duty to obtain Department of Corrections records as not under police or
prosecution control); Chandras,2002 WL 31946711, at *8 (stating stretching team concept
too far if no ongoing connection between agencies); Failla, 1993 WL 547419, at *5 (holding cooperating agencies for one case not necessarily arms of prosecutor for connected
case); People v. Santorelli, 718 N.Y.S. 2d 696, 700-01 (App. Div. 2000) (deciding no constructive possession by district attorney where federal agency conducts own parallel investigation); People v. Martin, 669 N.Y.S. 2d 268, 273 (App. Div. 1998) (determining district
attorney did not possess knowledge of police department internal investigation unrelated to
defendant's arrest due to its confidential nature).
78 See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 351 (refusing to hold Missouri prosecutor accountable for
information possessed by Illinois prosecutor as "no duty to conduct fishing expedition in
other jurisdictions"); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
no constructive possession by government based on failure to obtain all state conviction
information); United States v. Kern, 12 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to assign
knowledge of Omaha police's supplemental report to federal prosecutor as report never in
prosecutor's possession); United States v. Coleman, II F. Supp. 2d 689, 692 (W.D. Va.
1998) (holding knowledge of state prison officials not equivalent to knowledge of prosecution); Horton v. United States, 983 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (E.D. Va. 1997) (stressing state
agency not typically part of federal prosecution team).
'9 See Smith, 50 F.3d at 825 n.36 (discussing circuits' approach to imputing knowledge of different arms of state to prosecution).
80 United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 86 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing extent of
search expected of prosecution); see also United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st
Cir. 1991 ) (stating duty to ask all government personnel in position to know about material
information); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 600, 487 N.E. 2d 1351, 1357
(1986) (holding where federal and state agencies both investigated case, prosecution obligated to request FBI reports).
81 Osorio, 929 F.2d at 762 (viewing activities of various government agencies in
criminal prosecutions as having common purpose).
82 See Lavallee v. Coplan, 239 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (D.N.H. 2003) (discussing focus
of Brady rule on avoiding miscarriage of justice).
83 See Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 970 (holding evidence in actual or constructive possession producible by prosecution); Levan v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 2d 270, 284 (E.D. Pa.
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however, a defendant has not specifically requested identifiable evidence,
courts refuse to require the prosecution to search the files from an unrelated case. 84 Both the Third and Ninth Circuits further obligate the prosecution to request information from all law enforcement agencies with some
possible link to its witnesses. 85 The prosecution must also search civil records when the government is pursuing civil and criminal actions against a
defendant rooted in the same issue. 86 The broad approach also considers
any agency responsible for overseeing compliance with a statute and participating with the prosecution in an investigation
as a prosecution team
87
member that must disclose its information.
C.

The Modified Approach

In applying the modified approach, the Fifth, Seventh, District of
Columbia, and Eleventh Circuits review the degree of participation and
cooperation between the agencies on a case-by-case basis rather than applying a per se rule. 88 This allows the Seventh Circuit, for example, to
draw on opinions from both the broad and narrow circuits in deciding its
opinions. 89 The Fifth Circuit explained that creating an inflexible division
2001) (deciding knowledge of state court convictions imputable to federal prosecutor);
United States v. Gonzalez, 938 F. Supp. 1199, 1207 (D. Del. 1996) (finding United States
Attorney in constructive possession of information possessed by FBI from pretrial investigation).
84 See Joseph, 996 F.2d at 41 (refusing to send prosecutors on "open-ended fishing
expeditions").
85 See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating prosecution
obliged to obtain and produce prison records); United States v. Thornton, I F.3d 149, 158
(3d Cir. 1993) (maintaining government must inquire of all agencies with possible knowledge and establish procedures for disclosure); In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719 (Cal. 1998)
(holding county crime lab was member of prosecution team requiring District Attorney to
disclose evidence); but see United States v. Mariani, 90 F. Supp. 2d 574, 594 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (finding prosecution not required to obtain information where no evidence of DEP
participation).
See United States v. Hankins, 872 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding prosecution must search related civil and criminal files for exculpatory material when seeking
civil and criminal charges against defendant).
87 See United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding FDA
files in
constructive possession of prosecutor).
88 See Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503 (joining Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in holding
duty to search extends to other agencies' files); Auten, 632 F.2d at 481 (focusing on "prosecution team" rather than distinguishing between government agencies); United States v.
Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting extensive cooperation between state and
federal agencies during entire investigation); United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 57 (5th
Cir. 1973) (applying a case-by-case analysis of relationship between agency and prosecution), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 206 n.2 (5th Cir.
1984).
89 Compare Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with other
circuits that information's availability hinges on its possession by arm of state), with United
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between federal and state agencies that worked together from the beginning of an investigation "would artificially contort the determination of
what is mandated by due process.' 90 Additionally, if the prosecution failed
to seek out easily accessible information and the court condoned this failure, it "would be inviting and placing a premium on conduct unworthy of
representatives of the United States Government. This [the court] decline[s] to do." 9'
The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the courts are mainly
concerned with balancing impartiality towards the defendant, on the one
hand, and the ease with which the government can obtain the documents
requested, on the other, versus whether the government actually physically
possesses the documents. 92 The court draws the line at defendants' re-

quests for the prosecution to perform a government-wide investigation for
documents useful to their defense. 93 The court also held, however, that a
prosecutor who has accessed the files of another agency during an investigation cannot avoid disclosing
those documents by simply ignoring the
94
materials after a review.
The Eleventh Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit's modified approach
in its own case-by-case analysis. 95 The court finds a case-by-case analysis
rather than a per se rule more effective in reviewing the extent of involvement between state and federal agencies. 96 Utilizing a case-by-case apStates v. Young, 20 F.3d 758, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Perdomo and Auten as
witness' undiscovered criminal records not result of failure to search), and United States v.
Peitz, No. 01 CR 852, 2002 WL 226865, at *3 (N.D. IIl. Feb. 14, 2002) (citing Second
Circuit in holding possession applies to entire prosecution team, but not nonmember government agencies).
90 Antone, 603 F.2d at 570; United States v. Wilson, 237 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding U.S. Marshal's Service part of prosecution team making failed drug test
evidence imputable, even though Marshall's role limited to holding defendants in custody).
91 Auten, 632 F.2d at 481 (concluding government knew of witness' criminal record
possessed by other agencies); but see Brown v. Cain, No. 95-2250, 1995 WL 495890, at *6
(E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1995) (finding prosecution not required to locate information not contained in FBI and state criminal databases or possessed by unrelated agencies).
92 See United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1470, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reviewing question of what constitutes agency connected to prosecution).
93 See id. at 1485 (discussing limitations on government's obligation to produce
documents to defendant).
94 See id. at 1478 (pointing out decisions of other courts regarding documents in
possession of other agencies).
95 See Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating necessary to
analyze each case individually when determining level of cooperation and interaction between agencies) (citing United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 1979)).
96 See Moon, 285 F.3d at 1310 (refusing to assume Georgia prosecutor possessed
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation file on second murder); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d
1554, 1567 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) (finding investigators not required to disclose exculpatory
evidence directly to defense as duty on prosecutor to produce); but see United States v.
Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (1Ith Cir. 1992) (holding evidence possessed by prosecutor
for assault case involving same defendant equivalent to government's possession in narcot-

96

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

proach allows the court to assess the practice of other circuits, to weigh the
level of involvement between the various government agencies, and to
measure the degree of authority the prosecution has over that agency. 97
IV. SHORTCOMINGS AND SOLUTIONS
Courts face two competing but equally important concerns when defining who is a member of the prosecution team. 98 Their first concern is to
avoid unnecessarily burdening frequently understaffed and underfunded
prosecutors with the task of reviewing and analyzing excessive amounts of
documents from various agencies. 99 Their second concern is possibly denying evidence to a defendant that could prove his innocence, thus impeding the search for truth.1°° The sniper case reflects these two competing
concerns.' 0 The prosecution had to review documents in the files of a vast
array of state and federal agencies. 02 This review required a huge investment of time and staff; however, there is no questioning the importance of
the task to the defendants and to the criminal justice system. 103
A.

Problems with the BroadApproach

Some courts dislike the broad approach because they find that an
overly inclusive view of the prosecution team and disclosure requirements
leads to limitless requests by defendants, numerous inefficiencies in the
judicial system, increased costs to taxpayers, and risks of exposure to intelligence sources, operations, and investigations.'°4 One of the difficulties
prosecutors face is the special role they play in the criminal justice proc-

ics case).
17 See Moon, 285 F.3d at 1310-11 (discussing decisions by other courts
and degree of
involvement necessary between government agencies); Villaverde, supra note 56, at 150001 (analyzing Eleventh Circuit's approach).
98 See Seador, supra note 3 1, at 154 (noting competing concerns as underlying
reason
for disclosure dilemma).
99 See Nichols, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (recognizing impossible for prosecution to
review all documents created by numerous agencies involved in case and existence of reasonable limits); Seador, supra note 31, at 154 (noting courts worried about weighing down
prosecution with additional obligations), Taslitz, supra note 31, at 1 (remarking on state
budgetary restraints affecting prosecution's resources).
1ooSee Seador, supra note 31, at 154 (emphasizing finding of truth is mission of criminal justice process).
101See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
102

See id.

103

See McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. at 1450 (stating prosecution has duty to learn every-

thing contained in archives and databanks of all agencies gathering information).
104 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 348 (detailing dangers of overly broad disclosure
requirements); Jones, supra note 16, at 756 (explaining Brady does not entitle defendant to
a fishing expedition).
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ess.' 0 5 As officers of the court, they must manage conflicting obligations
to seek convictions while achieving justice.' ° 6 This role creates constitutional, statutory, and ethical obligations to protect the honesty and equality
of the criminal justice system. °7 As one court noted, "an inaccurate conviction based on government failure to turn over an easily turned rock is
essentially as offensive as one based on government non-disclosure."' 0 8
The broad approach requires overburdened prosecutors to spend excessive time objectively reviewing their files and other agencies' files in
the search for relevant, admissible exculpatory evidence.' °9 The broad
approach becomes unreasonably burdensome when it sends prosecutors on
"open-ended fishing expeditions" searching through unrelated files for
unspecified information. 0 The broad approach encourages defense attorneys to rely solely on the evidence produced by the prosecution rather than
conducting their own independent investigation."'
In applying the broad approach, courts impute knowledge of other
government agencies to the prosecution.1 2 Without some kind of routine
contact or investigative participation by these other agencies, this imputation extends the phrase, "acting on the government's behalf," beyond reasonable bounds.' 3 In most cases, the jump from routine cooperation of an
agency in areas of mutual interest to active knowledge of a specific case is
too vast for such unlimited application. 114 It is "reductio ad absurdum," or
a ridiculous conclusion for defendants to argue that the prosecution knows
what any other government agency or employee knows when the government has thousands of employees nationwide in various agencies. 15

105 See Santorelli, 718 N.Y.S. 2d at 700 (describing role of prosecutors).

See id.
See id. (enumerating prosecutor's heightened responsibilities).
"08 Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503.
'09 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696-97 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (explaining problems
faced by prosecution); Seador, supra note 31, at 154-55 (discussing concern not to overburden prosecutors).
11oSee Joseph, 996 F.2d at 41 (discussing need for specific requests to trigger searches
of unrelated files); McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. at 1451 (finding fairness obligates defense counsel to make clear and informative requests for documents).
I See Mahler, supra note 70, at 18 (emphasizing importance of defense to conduct
own investigation).
112 See Chandras, 2002 WL 31946711, at *8 (analyzing various cases imputing
knowledge to prosecution).
"' See id.
114 See Shakur, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 664 (holding knowledge of NYPD not imputable to
federal prosecution team).
"15 See Quinn, 445 F.2d at 944 (disposing of defense argument imputing knowledge of
evidence in sealed Florida case to prosecution as "reductio ad absurdum").
'06
107

98
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Problems with the NarrowApproach

The major criticism that some courts have of the narrow approach is
that it may hinder the search for truth.' 6 Courts that criticize the narrow
approach explain that deprivation of a defendant's due process rights occurs when the prosecution interprets its disclosure obligations too restrictively. 1 7 Courts critical of this approach repeatedly state that the Brady
rule is about more than guilt or trial strategy; it is about preventing a "miscarriage of justice. ' 18
The narrow approach allows a prosecutor to easily avoid finding out
what the government knows simply by declining to seek relevant information from those agencies likely to possess it." 9 Prosecutors can suppress
evidence by not searching for relevant information, such as a prior criminal
record, that is easily accessible through a standard review of its internal
files or the records of other government agencies.120 The government also
possesses more resources than the defense to analyze evidence and persuade witnesses to aid the case or testify at trial.' 2' The government's disclosure obligations affect every aspect of a defendant's trial preparation,
including any decision on whether to plead guilty. 22 A defendant should
make such a decision based on the same knowledge of favorable evidence
23
as that possessed by the government.
C.

The Modified Approach - Foundationfor a Solution

The modified approach uses a case-by-case analysis to review the
degree of participation and cooperation between the prosecution and an
agency to determine whether that agency is part of the prosecution team. 124
Using the modified approach as a foundation for solving the prosecution
team dilemma involves creating criteria to better define the relationship
116

See Seador, supra note 31, at 157-59 (noting Brady changed criminal process to

allow for emergence of truth).
117See Fredman, supra note 17, at 348 (asserting that searching too narrowly affects
due process rights).
"18See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675; Lavallee, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (asserting policy
argument supporting Brady rule is prevention of injustice).
1'9See Osorio. 929 F.2d at 761 (condemning as unacceptable prosecutor's avoidance
of searching for requested information).
120See Chandras, 2002 WL 31946711, at *7 (discussing ways prosecution could
avoid producing exculpatory evidence).
121 See Jones, supra note 16, at 744 (contending government in better position to obtain evidentiary information and witness testimony than defendant).
22See Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (commenting on importance of prosecutor's disclosure obligations to defendant).
123 See id. (maintaining defendant entitled to full disclosure of favorable evidence
when deciding on guilty plea).

124 See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
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between the prosecution and other agencies.1 25 Defining what constitutes
membership on the prosecution team provides a road map for the court,
the
26
prosecution, and the defense to follow in their pursuit of a fair trial.1
Courts generally agree that considering an agency a team member
requires a relationship between the agency and the prosecution. 27 The
relationship can combine agencies under the same sovereign, federal or
state, or can consist of federal and state agencies pursuing a joint investigation. 128 Where the combination is a state and federal agency or two different states, courts may need to determine on a case-by-case basis the extent
of cooperation between the agency and the prosecution. 29 For example, in
United States v. Deutsch, the court held that the Department of Justice
could not avoid production of the personnel file of a Post Office employee
used as a government witness in a bribery case. 30 The court determined
that the two agencies were too "closely connected" because the government's entire case involved bribery of a postal employee and that employee was the principal witness.' 3' Proving team membership by requiring a logical connection between the prosecution and another agency promotes fairness to the prosecution and the defense because a connection
prerequisite reduces the number of agencies the prosecution32 must search
and ensures a review of relevant materials for the defendant.
Establishing the closeness of the relationship between the prosecution and another agency also requires that the agency's role exceed merely
providing tips or leads acquired during independent investigations. 133 Requiring a greater role from the agency prevents an exhaustive search
through unlimited agency files and protects sensitive information from
125 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 348 (explaining no boundaries defined by courts or
Congress between prosecution and other agencies).
126 See Taslitz, supra note 31, at 13 (suggesting court should offer "road maps" to
participants in criminal justice system).
12 See Brooks, 966 F.2d at 1503 (finding duty to search where branches of government "closely aligned"); Antone, 603 F.2d at 569-70 (commenting on combined effort between state and federal agencies investigating case).
128 See Antone, 603 F.2d at 569-70 (refusing to distinguish between federal and state
agencies that have cooperated closely from beginning of investigation).
129See id. (preferring case-by-case analysis of relationship between two separate sovereigns); see also Moon, 285 F.3d at 1310 (agreeing with Antone analysis in holding no
joint investigation between Georgia prosecutor and Tennessee investigator).
130 See Deutsch, 475 F.2d at 57 (deciding government cannot deny accessibility
of
Post Office files when entities "closely connected").
131 See id. (holding government cannot narrowly categorize the Department of Justice
to avoid relationship with other government agency).
132 See Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. at 1487 (determining its holding protects defendant's
right to evidence and government from extensive search).
133 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 367 (describing when agency actively participates
in case); see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing need for agencies to
participate in investigations).
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unnecessary disclosure. 34 These types of requirements help both the
prosecutor and the defendant by focusing the search for exculpatory evidence on those agencies that might actually possess information rather
than
5
case.13
the
to
related
marginally
only
agencies
searching
randomly
Another means for determining team membership requires defendants to make specific discovery requests for exculpatory evidence or other
information that is only available to the defense from the government. 136
Precisely written requests submitted by a defendant notify the prosecution
of possible exculpatory material contained in a file in its office or that of
another agency. 3 Specific requests also signal the likelihood that evidence actually exists and the prosecution is not engrossed in a "fishing
expedition."' 138 A specific request is like a road map that guides the prosecution quickly to the files that need review
and allows the prosecution to
39
easily comply with its Brady obligations. 1
Using the modified approach also serves society's compelling interest in ensuring a fair and balanced criminal justice system. 4 0 A fair criminal justice system prevents prosecutorial misconduct and unjust convictions, safeguards the individual's due process rights, and protects intelligence sources and methods. 4' A criminal justice system with a level playing field for all promotes public confidence in criminal convictions. 42 As
criminal investigations become more complex because of advances in
technology and the involvement of greater numbers of agencies, including
134 See McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. at 1312 (explaining defendant seeking tangential in-

formation obtained by security agencies investigating terrorist groups); Fredman, supra
note 17, at 348 (stating broad response could endanger intelligence sources and methods).
135 See Fredman, supra note 17, at 366 (proposing delineating scope of search by
-'knowledge, access and relationship" with agency).
'3" See Mahler, supra note 70, at 18 (discussing methods of trial preparation for defense).

137 See id (stressing importance of defense's providing precise requests as guide for

prosecution to exculpatory evidence).
138 See Moon, 285 F.3d at 1310 (stating no obligation to undertake aimless search to
discover evidence) (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989)).
13, See id.; Joseph, 996 F.2d at 41 (discussing need for specific requests to trigger
searches of unrelated files).
140 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (stating society benefits when justice system operates
equitably); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1988) (commenting on ethical
duty of prosecution to seek justice as representative of society); Corcoran, supra note 26, at
865 (expressing interest of society in fairness and justice); Fredman, supra note 17, at 340
(analyzing goals of discovery rules to ensure evenhanded trial).
141 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (reiterating the importance of fair trials to society);
Jones, supra note 16, at 740 (stating "true mechanism for justice is a fair process"); Taslitz,
supra note 31, at 7 (remarking on importance of preventing wrongful convictions to preserve public confidence in trials); Villaverde, supra note 56, at 1538 (analyzing disclosure
by prosecution intended to implement societal policies beneficial to judicial system).
142See Jones, supra note 16, at 736 (assessing judicial system as based on adversarial
relationship between two similarly situated opponents).
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international investigative agencies, new public safety issues arise. 43 Protecting intelligence sources and the methods used by intelligence agencies
while still apprehending criminals also serves the public's interest.' 44 Using the modified approach allows courts to balance the response necessary
by the government with the defendant's due process rights without promoting inefficiency or endangering intelligence sources.145 "It is desirable
for
46
the guilty to be convicted, but not at the expense of a fair process."'1
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should address the confusion among the circuits
concerning how to define a member of the prosecution team and to what
extent the prosecution must search the files of other government agencies
for exculpatory evidence. The Court should provide specific guidance and
requirements based on a refined modified approach. This approach should
allow for flexibility when needed, yet also provide the kind of specificity
that the courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel need in preparing for and
trying cases. As computers and technology make the global community
smaller, criminal cases grow more complex and involve more agencies in
their investigation. The sniper case exemplifies this new type of criminal
case and demonstrates the need for guidance from the Court.
Some standard for weighing the involvement of an agency in a
criminal investigation needs development. Striking a balance between
reasonable discovery requests and assertions of remote connections between records in the hands of another agency is imperative. The time has
come for the Supreme Court to provide assistance in establishing guidance
and procedures for fairly and equitably identifying members of the prosecution team.
147
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143 See generally Nichols, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1202 (discussing investigation of case

by numerous local and federal agencies); McVeigh, 945 F. Supp. 1441, 1443-46 (analyzing

complexity of cases based on investigations by multiple agencies and defense requests for
classified information); Fredman, supra note 17, at 332-37 (analyzing changes in criminal
investigations and effects on prosecution); Villaverde, supra note 56, at 1472-75 (discussing prosecution's difficulties in disclosing evidence due to development of international
terrorism investigations).
'4 See sources cited supra note 143.

145See id.

146 Kurcias, supra note 16, at 1228.

147This note is dedicated to my husband Michael for providing unconditional love and
support throughout my law school journey.

